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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
The Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections and other officials of the Commonwealth 
(collectively “the Commonwealth”)1 appeal the May 29, 2009 
                                              
1
 More specifically, the Appellants are the Secretary, 
Jeffrey A. Beard; the Superintendent of the State Correctional 
3 
 
Order of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania granting William Evans‟s petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus and ordering Evans‟s release.  The 
District Court held that Evans‟s due process rights had been 
violated by a change in the  calculation of his release date.  
For the following reasons, we conclude that the District Court 
erred in holding that Evans had a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest in a miscalculated release date and further 
erred in holding that his due process rights were violated.  We 
will therefore reverse the District Court‟s order and remand 
with the instruction that Evans‟s habeas petition be denied.  
 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 
Evans was arrested in Memphis, Tennessee, on 
warrants issued by Lehigh County, Pennsylvania charging 
him with rape of minors, and was ultimately convicted of 
multiple counts of rape, incest, involuntary deviate sexual 
intercourse, and terroristic threats.  At the end of the tortuous 
route this case has taken, he was left in prison for several 
more years than he had long been led to believe he would 
serve.  The present appeal throws into relief the problems that 
even well-intentioned state actors and a conscientious district 
court can encounter when a mistake lies hidden for many 
years.   
 
Following his extradition from Tennessee, Evans was 
committed to Lehigh County Prison on November 6, 1986.  
Soon thereafter, he was formally charged by Lehigh County 
                                                                                                     
Institute at Waymart; the District Attorney of Lehigh County; 
and the Attorney General of Pennsylvania.     
4 
 
with the crimes for which he had been arrested.
2
   On 
November 13, 1986, Evans was transferred to Northampton 
County, Pennsylvania, and charged with separate counts of 
rape.  He was tried and convicted on both the charges in 
Northampton County and those in Lehigh County and 
sentenced on December 6, 1990 and March 21, 1991 
respectively.  The Pennsylvania Superior Court subsequently 
determined that those convictions were so affected with error 
that they had to be vacated and new trials granted.  
Commonwealth v. Evans, 603 A.2d 608 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). 
 
 On remand, Evans, who had been incarcerated since 
his extradition in 1986, stipulated to non-trial dispositions in 
both the case in the Northampton County Court of Common 
Pleas (the “Northampton Court”) and the case in the Lehigh 
County Court of Common Pleas (the “Lehigh Court”).  On 
January, 14, 1994, he was sentenced in the Northampton 
Court to 10 to 20 years of imprisonment and awarded credit 
for time served.  He was then, on June 29, 1994, sentenced in 
the Lehigh Court to 10 to 20 years of imprisonment to be 
served concurrently with the sentence imposed by the 
Northampton Court.  The sentence imposed by the Lehigh 
Court is the only one directly at issue on this appeal.  In 
                                              
2
 Evans was alleged to have repeatedly raped and 
assaulted three children, aged three, five, and eight, over the 
course of a year when the children lived with him.  The 
details of the crimes are horrific and need not be recounted 
here.  It is sufficient to note that, at least before us, Evans 
does not dispute those details and they comport with the 
crimes for which he was later sentenced.  The children were 
“related to [Evans] and [he was] in a position of care and 
trust.”  (App. at 134.) 
5 
 
sentencing Evans, the Lehigh Court stated that he would be 
given “credit … as required by law for all time spent in 
custody as a result of these criminal charges for which 
sentence is being imposed.”  (App. at 133.) 
 
A few days later, on July 8, 1994, someone at the 
Lehigh Court prepared an administrative form called a “Court 
Commitment Form DC-300B” (the “Commitment Sheet”), 
recording the effective date of the Lehigh County sentence as 
November 6, 1986, which corresponds to the date Evans was 
placed in the Lehigh County prison after his extradition.  The 
Commitment Sheet was not signed by the sentencing judge.  
By designating the date of Evans‟s sentence as November 6, 
1986, the Lehigh Court was effectively granting credit on the 
Lehigh County sentence for Evans‟s time served from 
November 6, 1986, forward.  That designation, however, ran 
afoul of Pennsylvania law because it included credit for time 
served that had already been applied to the sentence Evans 
was serving on his conviction in Northampton County.
3
 
                                              
3
 Pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9760, “if [a] 
defendant is arrested on one charge and later prosecuted on 
another charge … credit against the maximum term and any 
minimum term of any sentence resulting from such 
prosecution shall be given for all time spent in custody under 
the former charge that has not been credited against another 
sentence.”  See also Bright v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 831 
A.2d 775, 778 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (holding that 
“[s]ection 9760(4) makes it clear that time credit on a 
sentence may be granted only when it has not already been 
credited toward another sentence”); Doria v. Pa. Dep’t of 
Corr., Records Dep’t., 630 A.2d 980, 982 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1993) (holding that presentence custody time in one county 
6 
 
Later that year, the Department of Corrections 
(“DOC”) realized that the Commitment Sheet reflected that 
Evans was being given credit for time served on his Lehigh 
County sentence from November 13, 1986, to March 20, 
1991, even though that time had already been credited to his 
Northampton County sentence.  The DOC recognized that 
Evans was not entitled to such double-crediting and, on 
December 28, 1994, wrote the Lehigh Court, advising the 
sentencing judge of the problem and saying:  
 
[T]o date, [the Department has] not extended 
any duplicative portion of this credit to this 
inmate.  If your honor agrees that the credit is 
not appropriate, then amended commitment 
papers from the Clerk of the Court removing the 
reference to this credit would be sincerely 
appreciated.  However, if Your Honor disagrees 
with the analysis set forth in this letter and 
wishes the Department to apply the full amount 
of credit originally indicated for this sentence, 
the Department will apply that credit upon 
receiving your reply to this letter confirming 
your intention. 
(App. at 157.)  The DOC‟s letter indicated that a copy was 
sent to Evans‟s counsel, but Evans claims he never saw it.4   
                                                                                                     
could not be credited toward the additional counties‟ 
sentences, even if the sentences were ordered to run 
concurrently). 
4
 Despite the DOC‟s letter, approximately six weeks later, 
on February 9, 1995, the Commitment Sheet, which had been 
issued by the Lehigh Court in 1994 without certification, was 
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 Nearly eleven years after the imposition of Evans‟s 
Lehigh County sentence, the DOC issued a Sentence Status 
Summary on April 13, 2005, deducting the credit for time he 
served between November 13, 1986, to March 20, 1991, 
which had improperly been reflected on Evans‟s Commitment 
Sheet.
5
  After that change, Evans‟s release date was moved 
                                                                                                     
certified.  That the Commitment Sheet at first was not signed 
by the sentencing judge and did not bear the seal or signature 
of the Lehigh Court clerk did not, however, deprive the 
document of legal effect.  See Boyd v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 831 
A.2d 779, 783 n.6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (concluding that 
even though a Court Commitment order, Form DC-300B was 
completed by a clerk on the court‟s behalf and was not signed 
by the sentencing judge, it was not improper for the DOC to 
rely on it.). 
5
 The DOC does not have the “power to change sentences, 
or to add or remove sentencing conditions, including credit 
for time served; this power is vested in the sentencing court.”  
Commonwealth v. Mann, 957 A.2d 746, 749 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2008); see also McCray v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 872 A.2d 1127, 
1133 (Pa. 2005) (finding that the DOC is an executive branch 
agency and has no duty or power to adjust sentencing 
conditions, specifically to award credit for time previously 
served).  Here, the DOC initially recalculated the maximum 
release date, a function arguably beyond its authority, but the 
corrected maximum release date was later affirmed by the 
trial court‟s issuance of an amended Commitment Sheet.  The 
DOC and the trial court gave time credit to Evans from the 
original arrest on November 6, 1986, to November 12, 1986.  
Evans was also awarded credit for the time of the vacated 
Lehigh County sentence until the new sentence – March 21, 
1991, to June 29, 1994.  Accordingly, the time period that 
8 
 
from November 2006 to March 2011.
6
  Upon learning of his 
amended release date, Evans promptly filed in the Lehigh 
Court a pro se petition claiming that the DOC had acted 
improperly.   
 
The Lehigh Court denied Evans‟s request that he retain 
the credit for time served as reflected on the Commitment 
Sheet.  An amended Commitment Sheet was issued by the 
Lehigh County Clerk on May 25, 2005, changing the 
effective date of Evans‟s sentence from November 6, 1986, to 
June 29, 1994, and Evans was advised of that change on 
June 1, 2005. 
 
Shortly thereafter, on June 24, 2005, Evans filed a pro 
se motion to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere, which the 
Lehigh Court treated as a petition for relief under the Post 
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 9541-9546.  On August 23, 2005, the Lehigh Court 
dismissed that PCRA petition as untimely, because Evans had 
failed to file the petition within one year of the availability of 
PCRA relief.
7
  On November 17, 2005, Evans responded by 
                                                                                                     
was treated as a duplicate credit contrary to Pennsylvania law 
was from November 13, 1986, to March 20, 1991.   
6
 There is some confusion as to Evans‟s corrected release 
date.  The revised Court Commitment Sheet reflects March 
14, 2011.  However, the briefs and the Memorandum of the 
Clerk show March 7, 2011.  For the purposes of this opinion, 
March 14, 2011, will be the controlling date.  
7
 Under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9545(b)(1), petitions for 
relief must be filed within one year of the date the judgment 
became final which, in Evans‟s case, was in 1994.  However, 
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filing a motion to appeal nunc pro tunc, in an attempt to 
challenge the effect of the August 23, 2005 order.  The 
Lehigh Court denied his motion without a hearing.  Evans 
then appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which 
also denied him relief.  In its opinion, the Superior Court 
noted the “gross untimeliness” of his November 17, 2005 
motion to appeal nunc pro tunc and determined that, because 
of that, the motion should be treated as a second PCRA 
petition.  (App. at 181.)  Treating it as such, the Superior 
Court found it untimely because it was filed more than one 
year after the effective date of the PCRA, and Evans had 
failed to successfully invoke any of the statutory exceptions 
to that timing requirement.
8
  (Id.)     
                                                                                                     
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9545 became effective on January 
16, 1996, which was after Evans‟s judgment had become 
final.  See Section 3(1) of Act Nov. 17, 1995 (Spec. Sess. No. 
1), P.L. 1118, No. 32.  Therefore, Evans‟s petition would be 
considered timely filed if first filed by January 16, 1997, one 
year after the effective date of the Act, not the date of his 
judgment.  Id.   
8
 There are three exceptions to the timeliness requirement 
which a petitioner must allege and prove.  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 9545(b)(1).  Those are: “(i) the failure to raise the 
claim previously was the result of interference by government 
officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the 
Constitution or laws of the United States; (ii) the facts upon 
which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner 
and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due 
diligence; or (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right 
that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United 
States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time 
10 
 
Evans next filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
9
  He argued, 
among other things, that the Lehigh Court lacked jurisdiction 
to amend his release date and that the amendment violated his 
due process rights.  The assigned Magistrate Judge issued a 
Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) recommending that 
Evans‟s habeas petition be denied because, although the 
“Court cannot condone the fact that [Evans] was repeatedly 
misled, over a period of eleven years, to believe his sentence 
expiration date was in November 2006 … the error [did] not 
rise to constitutional proportions.”   (App. at 45.)   While the 
District Court adopted the R & R in part, it ordered Evans‟s 
release because it concluded that the DOC and the Lehigh 
Court “arbitrarily and capriciously” amended Evans‟s release 
date in violation of his due process rights.  Evans v. Beard, 
639 F. Supp. 2d 497, 511 (E.D. Pa. 2009).  The 
Commonwealth‟s timely appeal of that decision is before us 
now.
 
 
 
                                                                                                     
period provided in this section and has been held by that court 
to apply retroactively.”  
9
 That petition was filed on November 30, 2005, but was 
put on hold and not addressed by the District Court pending 
the Superior Court‟s ruling on Evans‟s then-pending PCRA 
petition.  The case was removed from administrative suspense 
on August 14, 2006.   
11 
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over Evans‟s 
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
10
  We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
When a petitioner properly presents federal claims to a 
state court, but the state court does not consider the merits of 
the federal claims, the deferential standard of review set forth 
in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”) is inapplicable.11  See Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 
                                              
10
 The R & R recommended that 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d)(1)(D), an exception to the statute of limitations 
period for habeas petitions, be applied in this case.  That 
exception gives inmates one year to file a petition after “the 
date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 
due diligence.”  Id.  The District Court adopted that 
recommendation.  Before us, the Commonwealth does not 
challenge the District Court‟s adoption of the R & R‟s 
recommendation that this exception applies.  We likewise 
agree that it is applicable, because Evans could not have 
brought his claim concerning the amendment of the 
Commitment Sheet until, of course, the amendment occurred.   
11
 AEDPA provides:  “An application for a writ of habeas 
corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to 
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted 
in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 
12 
 
1769, 1784 (2009) (holding that “[b]ecause the Tennessee 
courts did not reach the merits of [the] claim, federal habeas 
review is not subject to the deferential standard that applies 
under AEDPA”); cf. Harris v. Ricci, 607 F.3d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 
2010) (holding AEDPA applicable when the merits of a 
petitioner‟s claim on appeal were adjudicated on the state 
level).  Instead, Evans‟s federal “claim is reviewed de novo.”  
Cone, 129 S. Ct. at 1784.  Likewise, because “the District 
Court relie[d] entirely on the state court record and [did] not 
hold an evidentiary hearing, our review of the District Court‟s 
decision is … plenary.”  Satterfield v. Johnson, 434 F.3d 185, 
190 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 
A writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary form of 
relief and is granted only to remedy constitutional error.  
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633-34 (1993) (noting 
that habeas corpus has been regarded as an extraordinary 
remedy and that “[t]hose few who are ultimately successful 
[in obtaining habeas relief] are persons whom society has 
grievously wronged”) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  When there is error of constitutional magnitude, the 
question becomes whether that error was harmless or whether 
it “had substantial and injurious effect.”  Fry v. Pliler, 551 
U.S. 112, 116 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  In the latter event, habeas relief may be granted.  
 
                                                                                                     
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 
the State court proceeding.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
13 
 
III. Discussion 
 
A. Procedural Default 
 
Before we examine the merits of Evans‟s due process 
claim, we must first consider the Commonwealth‟s argument 
that his claim is procedurally barred from federal habeas 
review because he did not appeal the dismissal of his first 
PCRA petition and the state courts dismissed his second 
PCRA petition as time-barred under state law.  Both the 
Magistrate Judge and the District Court concluded that 
Evans‟s claim was not procedurally barred.  We will not 
disturb the District Court‟s ruling in that regard.   
 
Though the Commonwealth failed to raise the issue of 
procedural default in the District Court proceedings or to 
object to the R & R‟s conclusion that Evans‟s claim was not 
procedurally defaulted, the Commonwealth has not waived its 
procedural default argument.  While we have the authority to 
impose the consequences of waiver in a habeas appeal when 
the Commonwealth has not properly asserted a procedural 
default defense in its answer to a habeas petition, see Szuchon 
v. Lehman, 273 F.3d 299, 321-22 (3d Cir. 2001), we believe 
the Commonwealth‟s Amended Response to Evans‟s habeas 
petition sufficiently raised the issue for the District Court‟s 
consideration.
12
  Certainly the procedural default issue was 
                                              
12
 We recognize that the Commonwealth‟s procedural 
default argument in its Amended Response was prompted by 
the Magistrate Judge‟s instruction.  That does not alter our 
conclusion, however, because a federal court has the authority 
to raise the issue of procedural default sua sponte.  See 
Szuchon, 273 F.3d at 321 n.13. 
14 
 
squarely addressed by both the Magistrate Judge and the 
District Court, and in a manner that did not prejudice Evans 
in any way.  Additionally, the Commonwealth‟s failure to file 
objections to the R & R, in the context of a federal habeas 
corpus proceeding, did not result in the loss of the statutory 
right to appellate review.  See Henderson v. Carlson, 812 
F.2d 874, 878-79 (3d Cir. 1987) (declining to adopt a rule 
conditioning “appellate review on the existence vel non of 
objections to a magistrate‟s report”).  Once the District Court 
independently reviewed the Magistrate Judge‟s R & R, the 
Commonwealth‟s “previous failure to object [became] 
irrelevant.”  Id. at 879 n.4.  Finding no waiver, then, we will 
consider the Commonwealth‟s position that Evans‟s due 
process claim is procedurally defaulted. 
 
  A state prisoner ordinarily must exhaust his federal 
claims in state court before seeking habeas relief in federal 
court.  Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 192 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Exhaustion requires a petitioner to “fairly present” his federal 
claims to the pertinent state courts before bringing those 
claims to federal court.  Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 365 
(3d Cir. 2007).  The exhaustion requirement is deemed 
satisfied when a petitioner has presented his claims to the 
state courts but the state courts have refused to consider the 
claims on the merits based on an independent and adequate 
state procedural rule.  Holland v. Horn, 519 F.3d 107, 112 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  In other words, a claim may be exhausted but still 
be deemed as defaulted under state law.  In that event, 
“federal habeas review … is barred unless the prisoner can 
demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a 
result of the violation of federal law, or demonstrate that 
failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental 
15 
 
miscarriage of justice.”  Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 
750 (1991); see Holland, 519 F.3d at 112. 
 
 Before a violation of a state procedural rule can 
foreclose federal habeas review, the state rule must be 
adequate, that is, “firmly established and regularly followed.”  
Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002) (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted).  Even if a state rule itself is 
adequate, the “exorbitant application” of the rule may in 
exceptional cases render the state ground inadequate to erect a 
procedural bar.  Id.; see Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 239-
40 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing factors to consider).  In 
deciding whether such a state procedural bar is adequate, it is 
not enough to say that the rule “generally serves a legitimate 
state interest”; rather, the adequacy “is determined with 
reference to the „particular application‟ of the rule.”  Cotto, 
331 F.3d at 240 (quoting Lee, 534 U.S. at 387). 
 
 In the current case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
dismissed Evans‟s second PCRA petition as untimely under 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9545(b)(1).  That state procedural 
rule requires that a PCRA petition, even a second or 
subsequent petition, be filed within one year of the date the 
judgment becomes final, unless “the facts upon which the 
claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could 
not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.”  
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9545(b)(ii); see Commonwealth v. 
Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1270 (Pa. 2007) (construing the so-
called “after-discovered evidence” exception).  The Superior 
Court correctly noted that Evans‟s judgment of sentence 
became final years before he filed his second PCRA 
16 
 
petition.
13
  The Superior Court acknowledged Evans‟s 
attempt to invoke the exception to the one-year period, but 
nonetheless dismissed his PCRA petition as “untimely and 
subject to no time of filing exceptions,” without mentioning 
any of the events that happened in 2005 – events which 
actually formed the basis for Evans‟s due process claim.  
(App. at 184.) 
 
 Under Pennsylvania law, the after-discovered evidence 
exception “simply requires petitioner to prove that there were 
„facts‟ that were „unknown‟ to him and that he exercised „due 
diligence.‟”14  Commonwealth v. Johnson, 945 A.2d 185, 189 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (quoting Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1270).  
Here, it is beyond dispute that the “facts” giving rise to 
Evans‟s due process claim were “unknown” to him until 
eleven years after he was sentenced.  Moreover, even if Evans 
had exercised the utmost diligence, he could not have 
                                              
13
 The Superior Court also noted that Evans‟s judgment of 
sentence became final prior to the January 16, 1996 effective 
date of the statute setting the one-year limit in the PCRA.  
Thus, in Evans‟s case, the one-year period expired one year 
after the effective date, rather than one year after his 
judgment became final in 1994. 
14
 We emphasize that we do not question whether the 
PCRA‟s one-year limit for filing PCRA petitions is adequate.  
See Fahy v. Horn, 516 F.3d 169, 189 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting 
that § 9545(b)(1) was firmly established and regularly applied 
as of November 23, 1998).  Rather, our inquiry focuses solely 
on the Superior Court‟s refusal to apply the after-discovered 
evidence exception to the one-year period in Evans‟s case 
specifically.   
17 
 
discovered these “facts” because the corrections to the 
calculation of his release date did not occur until 2005.   
 
Under these circumstances, the Pennsylvania courts‟ 
refusal to apply the after-discovered evidence exception is not 
an adequate basis to preclude federal habeas review of 
Evans‟s due process claim, and thus his due process claim is 
not procedurally defaulted.
15
  We therefore turn to the merits 
of his claim. 
 
                                              
15
 We note that there is an argument that Evans‟s claims 
are procedurally barred because his second PCRA petition 
was filed on November 17, 2005, more than sixty days after 
he learned of the newly-discovered facts.  To avoid being 
procedurally time-barred, “[a]ny petition invoking an 
exception … shall be filed within 60 days of the date the 
claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 9545(b)(2).  Therefore, Evans‟s second PCRA petition may 
be viewed as untimely under that requirement. However, the 
second PCRA petition was treated by the Superior Court as 
untimely not because it was filed sixty days late but because it 
was filed more than one year from Evans‟s sentencing date.  
In Holloway v. Horn, we stated that “[a] federal habeas court 
is „not bound to enforce a state procedural rule when the state 
itself has not done so, even if the procedural rule is 
theoretically applicable to [the] facts.‟”  355 F.3d 707, 714 
(3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).  Here, the Superior Court 
did not enforce the sixty-day rule even though it was 
theoretically applicable.  Nor will we.  
18 
 
B. Due Process 
 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”  U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV.  The core concept of due process is protection against 
arbitrary government action.  Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 
523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998).  As that concept has developed, it 
has come to have both substantive and procedural 
components.  Id. at 846.  Substantive due process is 
implicated if Evans had a cognizable constitutional right to be 
released on the date reflected by the original Commitment 
Sheet. Cf. id. (“[S]ubstantive due process guarantee protects 
against government power arbitrarily and oppressively 
exercised.”) (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 
(1986)).  Procedural due process is implicated if he had a 
liberty interest in his release that cannot be infringed without 
procedural protections such as notice and a hearing.  Cf. 
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846 (“[T]he procedural due process 
guarantee protects against „arbitrary takings.‟”) (citing 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972)).  We discuss each 
of those potential due process claims in turn.   
 
1. Substantive Due Process 
 
“The substantive component of the Due Process 
Clause limits what government may do regardless of the 
fairness of procedures that it employs.”  Boyanowski v. 
Capital Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 
2000).  The “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking” on 
what is a fundamental right protected by substantive due 
process are “scarce and open-ended.”  Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S 702, 720 (1997) (quoting Collins v. City 
19 
 
of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).  Indeed, 
there are inherent risks when “the judicial branch gives 
enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties without 
the guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of 
Rights.”  Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 
(1977).  For that reason, substantive due process “has at times 
been a treacherous field.”  Id.  Therefore, in considering 
whether Evans‟s claimed interest is protected by substantive 
due process, we must be mindful that the inquiry not devolve 
into an exploration of our own policy preferences.   See 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (“We must therefore exercise the 
utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in 
this field, lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause 
be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the 
Members of this Court.”) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).    
 
To determine whether one has been deprived of 
substantive due process, we first “define the exact contours of 
the underlying right said to have been violated.”  Leamer v. 
Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 546 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  While Evans complains of the 
delay associated with the change in his calculated release 
date, neither the District Court nor the parties have defined 
with particularity Evans‟s underlying right, but we understand 
him to be asserting that it is a fundamental right to be released 
from prison on or about a date certain.
16
  
                                              
16
 The District Court quoted part of Evans‟s objections to 
the R & R as follows: “The amendment of the effective date 
of Petitioner‟s Lehigh County sentence 11 years after its 
imposition and the resulting revised time credit ruling that 
changed Petitioner‟s maximum release date[] from 
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Next, because substantive due process protection 
“limits what the government may do in both its legislative 
and its executive capacities,” and a different analysis is 
applicable depending on which capacity is implicated, we 
must determine if Evans‟s claim is properly analyzed as one 
challenging executive or legislative action.  Lewis, 523 U.S. 
at 846 (citations omitted).  Here, the challenged conduct is 
fairly characterized as executive because Evans‟s alleged 
injury arises not from any legislative act, but rather from the 
DOC‟s delay in seeking correction of the double credit on the 
administrative records reflecting his time served.
17
  Because 
Evans‟s claim is directed at executive action, “the threshold 
question is whether the [governmental] behavior … is so 
egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock 
the contemporary conscience.”  Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8; 
see also United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of 
Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 399-400 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(acknowledging that “executive action violates substantive 
due process only when it shocks the conscience”).   
 
                                                                                                     
November 13, 2006 to March 13, 2011 [sic] violated 
Petitioner‟s 14th Amendment due process right not to be 
subject to unreasonable prejudicial delay in the allocation of 
time credit and the determination of the maximum service 
date of his sentence.”  (App. at 14-15.) 
17
 The action in question is actually the result of a 
combination of steps taken by the DOC and the Lehigh Court, 
but what the Court did was spurred by the DOC‟s long delay 
in pressing for correction of the Court‟s improper application 
of credit for time served.    
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What is shocking to the conscience inevitably depends 
to a degree on whose conscience is being tested; so, to put it 
mildly, the standard has some give in it.  That flexibility is 
manifested in the context-sensitivity of the standard.  See 
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 (noting that the measure of what 
“shocks the conscience” is not precise); Kaucher v. County of 
Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 426 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that “[t]he 
question of whether a given action shocks the conscience has 
an elusive quality to it” (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)).  What “shocks in one environment may not be so 
patently egregious in another.”  Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850.  
Therefore, “our concern with preserving the constitutional 
proportions of substantive due process demands an exact 
analysis of circumstances before any abuse of power is 
condemned as conscience shocking.”  Id. 
 
As a general matter, it is governmental “conduct 
intended to injure” that is “most likely to rise to the 
conscience-shocking level.”  Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849 (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted).  Conscience-shocking 
behavior may also arise in the form of injuries produced by 
deliberate indifference, although, where the conduct was not 
intentional, it is a “closer call[].”  Id.  “Negligently inflicted 
harm,” by contrast, “is categorically beneath the threshold of 
constitutional due process” and will never be conscience 
shocking.  Id. (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 
(1986)). 
 
Moving past generalities, our analysis here is informed 
by reference to specific kinds of executive conduct that have 
previously been characterized as conscience-shocking or not.  
For example, in United States v. Guevremont, we held that the 
correction of an illegal sentence is permissible even if it 
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results in an increase in the sentence.  829 F.2d 423, 427-
28 (3d Cir. 1987).  We concluded that, absent judicial 
vindictiveness, an increase to make the sentence conform to 
the intention of the sentencing judge is constitutional.  Id. at 
428.  Guevremont thus suggests that the correction to Evans‟s 
Commitment Sheet, which no one argues was motivated by 
judicial vindictiveness though it did result in a longer period 
of incarceration than Evans was led to anticipate, is not 
constitutionally infirm.  
 
Cases in which inmates have been erroneously 
released and then re-incarcerated are also instructive as to 
whether the correction of time-served credit in Evans‟s case 
“shocks the conscience.”  In Vega v. United States, a prisoner, 
through no apparent fault of his own, was erroneously 
released and proceeded to live as a free man for 
approximately two years before he was arrested to serve the 
remainder of his sentence.  493 F.3d 310, 313 (3d Cir. 2007).  
We concluded that the mistaken release of a prisoner does not 
prevent re-incarceration if time remains on the prisoner‟s 
sentence.
18
  Id. at 316.  We further addressed the question of 
                                              
18
 In fact, we found that point to be uncontroversial, noting 
that courts “generally agree upon the „power of the 
government to recommit a prisoner who is released or 
discharged by mistake, where his sentence would not have 
expired if he had remained in confinement.‟”  Vega, 493 F.3d 
at 315-16 (quoting White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th 
Cir. 1930) (explaining that there is “no doubt” about the 
government‟s power to reincarcerate an erroneously released 
prisoner)); see also Green v. Christiansen, 732 F.2d 1397, 
1399 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that “a ministerial mistake does 
not necessarily excuse [an erroneously released prisoner] 
23 
 
whether due process required credit be given against Vega‟s 
prison sentence for the time he was at liberty.  Id. at 314-15.  
Noting that several courts had decided that “a relatively high 
degree of culpability is required to shock the conscience in 
this context” and had declined to find due process violations 
under similar circumstances, we likewise determined that 
denying Vega credit for the time he was at liberty would not 
be a due process violation.  Id. at 316-17 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Vega demonstrates the high threshold for 
finding due process violations, showing that even where a 
prisoner had actually been released through no fault of his 
own, due process was not violated either by reincarcerating 
him or by denying him credit for his time at liberty.
19
 
                                                                                                     
from serving the rest of his sentence” where “his sentence 
would not have expired had he remained in confinement”). 
19
 While we could “not find a constitutional basis upon 
which to anchor the rule of credit for time spent erroneously 
at liberty,” we did hold that, under some circumstances, 
common law could provide a basis for a prisoner to receive 
credit for time at liberty.  Vega, 493 F.3d at 317.  In 
determining under what circumstances credit should be given, 
we explained that there were three interests at stake: a 
prisoner‟s right to serve a continuous sentence in a timely 
manner, the need to limit the arbitrary use of governmental 
power, and the government and societal interest in making 
sure a prisoner pays the debt he owes society.  Id. at 318.  
Balancing those interests, we articulated the following test to 
be applied in cases where a prisoner was mistakenly released 
and then reincarcerated:  a “prisoner is to receive credit for 
the time he was at liberty if he can bring forth facts indicating 
that he was released despite having unserved time remaining.  
The government may then respond to the petition by showing 
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 Given those precedents and the amorphous character 
of the shock-the-conscience test, we do not believe the 
Commonwealth‟s actions meet that test here.  The 
Commonwealth made a record-keeping mistake and then 
corrected it, eliminating the unlawful credit given to Evans on 
his Lehigh County sentence.  The deep disappointment which 
that change no doubt engendered is certainly regrettable, but 
that does not make the correction conscience-shocking.  
Moreover, unlike the petitioners in the mistaken-release 
cases, Evans was still in jail at the time the error in his 
sentencing calculations was made.  He had not yet tasted 
freedom.  If the re-incarceration of already-released convicts 
does not shock the conscience, then correcting the improper 
start date of a sentence for a still-imprisoned convict ought 
not.  
 
We do not utterly reject that there might be a 
“temporal limit” on a court‟s ability to correct a sentencing 
problem.  See Baker v. Barbo, 177 F.3d 149, 157-59 (3d Cir. 
1999) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus after 
concluding that petitioner‟s due process rights were not 
violated because the government had the right to appeal 
petitioner‟s sentence, which fell below the statutorily required 
minimum, and petitioner‟s expectation of release “could not 
have reached that „temporal limit‟ whatever it may be” that 
would limit the ability of a court to correct such an illegal 
                                                                                                     
that, either, the imprisoning sovereign was not negligent, or 
vicariously negligent, or that the prisoner, in any way, 
affirmatively effectuated his release or prevented his re-
apprehension.”  Id. at 323.   
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sentence).
20
  However, “[a] defendant … does not 
automatically acquire a vested interest in a shorter, but 
incorrect sentence.  It is only in an extreme case that a later 
upward revision of a sentence is so unfair that it is 
inconsistent with the fundamental notions of fairness found in 
the due process clause.”  United States v. Davis, 112 F.3d 
118, 123 (3d Cir. 1997).  This is not such a case.  It is well-
established that a prisoner cannot escape punishment simply 
because the court committed an error in passing sentence.  
                                              
20
 In Baker, the habeas petitioner was convicted of a crime 
that, under a recent statutory amendment, carried a mandatory 
minimum sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment with 25 
years of parole ineligibility.  177 F.3d at 152.  Mistakenly, the 
trial court sentenced Baker to a term of 11 years of parole 
ineligibility.  Id.  Baker appealed his sentence on other 
grounds and New Jersey cross-appealed seeking the 
imposition of the 25 years parole ineligibility as required by 
statute.  Id.  The trial court granted New Jersey‟s cross 
appeal, which Baker challenged in a habeas petition alleging 
that sufficient time had passed since the imposition of the 
original sentence so as to strip the trial court of its ability to 
correct the sentence.  Id. at 158.  We denied relief because: 1) 
“Baker‟s reasonable expectations could not have reached that 
„temporal limit‟” because the State sought to correct his 
sentence less than two years after its imposition and any 
expectation he did have could not have been final because his 
case was still on appeal;  2) Baker lacked “a substantial 
enough expectation of release”; 3) Baker‟s own appeal 
prevented his sentence from being “invested with finality”; 
and 4) the State‟s persuasive argument that, absent the 
correction, Baker would avoid the statutory minimum 
sentence and thus thwart the legislative process.  Id. 
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United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940, 946 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(citing Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166 (1947)).  
Neither should one escape punishment when the error at issue 
is not in the sentence itself but only in the record keeping 
associated with the sentence.   
 
While the passage of time may be a factor in 
determining whether a substantive due process violation has 
occurred, our passing references, in dicta, to a temporal limit 
cannot be construed on this record to prevent the correction of 
an administrative mistake so that a lawful sentence can be 
served.  Evans has presented no evidence to suggest that the 
DOC‟s delay was anything more culpable than negligence or 
that the correction of his sentence lacked a sound basis.  Cf. 
Hawkins v Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 746 (4th Cir. 1999) (“To 
declare the Parole Commission‟s decision so egregious and 
outrageous as to shock the contemporary conscience …  , we 
would have to believe that it was infected or driven by 
something much worse -more blameworthy- than mere 
negligence, or lack of proper compassion, or sense of 
fairness, or than might invoke common law principles of 
estoppel or fair criminal procedure to hold the state to its 
error.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  There is ample 
room for complaint about what happened here, but there is 
nothing “so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be 
said to shock the contemporary conscience” and hence 
constitute a substantive due process violation.  Lewis, 523 
U.S. at 847 n.8.   
 
2. Procedural Due Process 
 
Procedural due process governs the manner in which 
the government may infringe upon an individual‟s life, 
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liberty, or property.  Prisoners are not completely deprived of 
the protections of the Due Process Clause simply because 
they are prisoners.  Procedural protections must be afforded 
to them before they are stripped of the rights they still retain 
while incarcerated.  See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 
558 (1974) (finding that a prisoner must be provided due 
process before the revocation of “good time” credit for 
misconduct).   
 
In analyzing a procedural due process claim, we must 
first “determine whether the nature of the interest is one 
within the contemplation of the „liberty or property‟ language 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 
775, 782 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Although the interests protected by procedural due 
process are much broader than those protected by substantive 
due process,  Bell v. Ohio State Univ., 351 F.3d 240, 249-50 
(6th Cir. 2003), if there is no constitutionally protected 
interest, our inquiry stops.  If, however, we “determine that 
the interest asserted is protected by the Due Process Clause, 
the question then becomes what process is due to protect it.”  
Newman, 617 F.3d at 783 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).   
 
Evans does not contend that his life or property is at 
issue.  The question is whether he has a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest at stake.   As previously noted, 
Evans‟s claimed interest was not defined with particularity, 
but it seems clear that the idea being pursued is that, in being 
systematically misled as to his true maximum release date, 
Evans had a legitimate expectation of being released on a 
particular date and his expectation matured into a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest.  
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According to our precedent, a prisoner holds a liberty 
interest triggering due process protection in two instances: 
when “state statutes and regulations create a liberty interest in 
freedom from restraint that imposes an atypical and 
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 
incidents of prison life,” and when “severe changes in 
conditions of confinement amount to a grievous loss that 
should not be imposed without the opportunity for notice and 
an adequate hearing.”  Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 
325 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  We have characterized the first as a “so-called 
state-created liberty interest” and the second as a “so-called 
independent due process liberty interest.”  Id.   
 
a) State Created Liberty Interest  
 
We are unable to discern a state-created liberty interest 
here.  Evans entered a plea of nolo contendre to three counts 
of rape in the first degree.  At the sentencing hearing, the 
Lehigh Court imposed the following sentence: 
 
That you undergo imprisonment for a period of 
not less than 10 years no more than 20 years … 
[a]nd credit be given you as required by law for 
all time spent in custody as a result of these 
criminal charges for which your sentence is 
being imposed … [that] [s]entence shall run 
concurrent with any sentence imposed in 
Northampton County…[and t]hat you will be 
placed on probation for a period of 20 years 
under the supervision of the Pennsylvania 
Board of Probation and Parole.  
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(App. at 133.)  The sentence itself is entirely lawful,
21
 though 
the record keeping associated with it was in error.  As has 
been discussed, the initial Commitment Sheet wrongly 
credited Evans for presentence time that had already been 
applied to another sentence.  That improper application of 
credit gave Evans an artificially early start date to his 
sentence, which led to the miscalculation of his release date.  
Later – unfortunately, much later – the court issued a 
corrected Commitment Sheet, which reflected the proper start 
date of his sentence.
22
  That correction necessarily resulted in 
                                              
21
 By specifically stating that credit for time spent in 
custody be given “as required by law,” the sentence 
recognizes that it could only operate within the bounds of 
Pennsylvania law, which would afford Evans credit for time 
served that had not already been applied to the earlier 
rendered Northampton County sentence.  That is also 
reflected by the R & R‟s recommendation, which the District 
Court seemed to adopt, that the amendment of the 
Commitment Sheet which indicated an unlawful application 
of credit for time served did not alter Evans‟s sentence.  The 
parties do not dispute that holding.   
22
 In Pennsylvania, if no appeal has been taken, a court 
may “modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its 
entry.”  Commonwealth v. Klein, 781 A.2d 1133, 1135 (Pa. 
2001) (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5505).   However, the 
court retains the “inherent powers to amend its records, to 
correct mistakes of the clerk or other officer of the court, 
inadvertencies of counsel, or supply defects or omissions in 
the record, even after the lapse” of thirty days.  Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  Moreover, even if 
one were to construe the Commitment Sheet as a sentence, a 
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a later release date, but it did not amend his sentence beyond 
the ten to twenty years which he was always required to 
serve.  Evans was not stripped of any state-created liberty 
interest because state law never entitled him to be released on 
the date reflected on the initial Commitment Sheet.  Evans 
can point to no statutory language limiting the power of the 
Commonwealth to correct the credit.  There is no regulation 
to support the double application of his presentence credit 
because such an application is indisputably illegal in 
Pennsylvania.   
 
The Supreme Court‟s decision in Jago v. Van Curen, 
454 U.S. 14 (1981) counsels against any finding of a state 
created liberty interest here.  The Court specifically addressed 
whether an inmate‟s pre-release expectation of freedom was a 
liberty interest deserving procedural due process protections.  
Id. at 16-17.  The inmate had received a communication from 
the Parole Board indicating that he was to be released on 
parole.  Id. at 15.  Before he was paroled, however, he 
received notice that his parole was being withdrawn because 
the Parole Board had received information that he had been 
untruthful throughout his evaluation for parole.  Id.  The 
inmate filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.  
Id. at 16.  That court held that state law was unambiguous and 
that the inmate had no protectable interest in a release earlier 
                                                                                                     
“sentencing court can sua sponte, correct an illegal sentence 
originally imposed, even after the defendant has begun 
serving the original sentence.”  Commonwealth v. 
Santone, 757 A.2d 963, 966 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 639 A.2d 1235, 1239 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1994)).    
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than his actual release date.  Id.  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court, 
holding that, because the inmate had been notified that the 
Parole Board was ordering release, he had “a legitimate 
expectation that his early release would be effected” and that 
that expectation was a protectable liberty interest.  Id. at 17.  
The Supreme Court in turn reversed the Sixth Circuit and 
held that, although the inmate had suffered a grievous loss 
upon the rescission of his parole, he did not have a 
protectable liberty interest in his anticipated parole.  Id. at 17-
18.  
 
If there is no protected liberty interest in anticipated 
parole, we think it stands to reason that there is likewise no 
protected liberty interest in the expectation of release on an 
erroneously calculated release date.
23
  Indeed, Jago faced 
much more severe consequences from the state‟s change in 
position on parole than Evans did from the correction of his 
Commitment Sheet.  Jago was promised parole from a 
maximum sentence of 100 years, so he effectively went from 
                                              
23
 Jago is factually distinguishable from Evans‟s case in at 
least two respects.  First, Jago contributed to the demise of his 
freedom – he lied in both his parole interview and in his 
parole plan.  Id. at 15.  Evans, on the other hand, was 
blameless in the inappropriate application of the double credit 
and engaged in no behavior to put that credit in peril.  
Second, Jago‟s pre-release expectation of freedom lasted at 
most a relatively brief two and a half months, while Evans 
was misinformed as to his maximum release date for over 
eleven years.  These distinctions do not, however, detract 
from the basic point concerning a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest. 
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imminent release to life in prison.  Jago, 454 U.S. at 14.  In 
contrast, Evans was facing approximately four years more 
than the Commitment Sheet had led him to believe.     
 
Moreover, the freedom that Jago was trying to claim 
was consistent with state law, while Evans‟s claim is not.  
That is, there is nothing in the Supreme Court‟s opinion to 
suggest that the parole statute pursuant to which Jago was to 
be released was somehow contrary to Ohio law, but Evans‟s 
claim to be released four years earlier than allowed by his 
sentence is plainly contrary to Pennsylvania law.  In addition, 
Evans and his counsel were present when the Lehigh Court 
announced that Evans was only to receive credit for time 
served “as required by law.”  The Supreme Court‟s 
conclusion that there was no liberty interest deserving of 
procedural due process protection in Jago‟s effort to be 
released from incarceration on legally proper parole 
undermines any argument that Evans has a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest in being released contrary to 
Pennsylvania law.  Therefore, if Evans has any liberty interest 
at all in an artificially early release date, it is not state-created.  
 
b) Independent Due Process Liberty 
  
It follows that any liberty interest Evans can claim 
must be of the “independent due process liberty interest” 
variety.  The question, then, is whether the correction of a 
Commitment Sheet, eleven years after it was initially issued, 
amounted to a severe alteration in the conditions of Evans‟s 
incarceration such that due process protections were required.  
See Renchenski, 622 F.3d at 325 (concluding that a prisoner‟s 
liberty interest can be violated when severe changes in 
confinement conditions amount to a grievous loss and are 
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made without notice and a hearing).  The answer is 
straightforward:  while the administrative correction 
increased the period he was confined beyond what he had 
expected, it did not at all change the conditions under which 
he was confined.   
 
Severe changes in conditions of confinement include, 
for example, forced administration of antipsychotic 
medication, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222 
(1990), or involuntary transfer to a mental hospital, Vitek v. 
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980), or, for a prisoner not 
convicted of a sex offense, forced participation in sex-
offender therapy, Renchenski, 622 F.3d at 326.  Again, there 
is no indication that anything changed relating to Evans‟s 
conditions of confinement, let alone anything of a magnitude 
comparable to the aforementioned examples.  Time is of 
course important, and we do not minimize the magnitude of 
the record keeping mistake and communication blunders that 
have brought the case to us, but time is a feature of a sentence 
of incarceration, not in itself a condition of confinement, and 
the passage of time in this case had no effect on the 
conditions Evans was required to endure.   
 
In short, because Evans lacks a constitutionally 
protected interest in his expectation of release based on the 
misapplied credit for time served, no procedural due process 
violation could have occurred.    
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons we conclude that the learned 
District Judge‟s order granting habeas relief must be reversed 
and the case remanded with instruction to deny Evans‟s 
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petition.  We recognize that, since Evans‟s correct release 
date has already come and gone as of March 14, 2011, the 
practical effect of denying habeas relief is at this juncture 
uncertain, but we leave it to authorities in Pennsylvania to 
determine in the first instance whether Evans should remain 
on probation or be re-incarcerated.   
